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1. Introduction 
Numerous technologies are available for automatic verification of a person's identity. The 
authentication process usually involves verification of what a person knows (e.g., 
passwords, pass phrases, PINs), has (e.g., tokens, smart cards), is (e.g., fingerprint, hand 
geometry, facial features, retinal print, iris pattern), or generates (e.g., signature, voice). Use 
of something known by a person and use of something held by a person are two simple 
identification/verification solutions widely used today. Biometrics (also known as 
biometry) is defined as “the identification of an individual based on biological traits, such as 
fingerprints, iris patterns, and facial features” (McFedries, 2007), and relies on what a person 
is or can generate. 
Using something one knows requires only a good memory, but can on the other hand be easily 
overheard, seen, or even guessed. An item that one holds can be stolen and used or copied 
later. Using biometrics might at first seem to overcome these problems since fingerprints, iris 
patterns, etc. are part of one's body and thus not easily misplaced, stolen, forged, or shared. 
Indeed, biometrics technology is becoming a preferred standard for identification and 
authentication in ATMs, credit card transactions, electronic transactions, e-passports, airports, 
international borders, nuclear facilities and other highly restricted areas. Presently Europe 
leads the way but, the highest growth potential is forecasted to be in Asia as many Asian 
countries have already started adopting the technology. Its market size is estimated to be 
US$7.1 billion by 2012 (Bailey, 2008). Ironically however, this widespread acceptance of 
biometrics technology has been attracting the attention of attackers and has provoked interest 
in exploration of spoofing mechanisms against biometric systems. For example, the thousands 
of fingerprints that one leaves everywhere in one's daily life can be recovered and molded into 
artificial fingers for fooling biometrics devices based on fingerprint detection. In an experiment 
conducted by Matsumoto et al., eleven optical and silicon fingerprint sensors accepted 
artificial fingers in at least sixty percent of attempts (Matsumoto et al., 2002). Furthermore, 
with a commercially available high resolution digital camera, the iris pattern of a person's eye 
can be readily extracted from the person's facial picture and molded into contact lenses to be 
used to fool machines employing iris pattern recognition. An experiment conducted on two 
commercial iris recognition devices also showed that one of these devices could be fooled 50% 
of the time and the other 100% of the time (Matsumoto et al., 2002, 2004).  
Although susceptibility of most biometric system to spoofing have been experimented on 
fingerprint and iris recognition devices as these technologies are used in a variety of 
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commercial products, other biometrics devices can also be spoofed, and to give examples, a 
dummy hand can be used on a hand geometry system, a high resolution picture can be used 
on a face recognition system, etc. 
In view of this, international biometrics standard organizations are quite concerned about 
the vulnerabilities of biometrics system and reliabilities of corresponding countermeasures 
(Tilton, 2006). As a matter of fact, biometrics security, including spoofing, dominated 
agenda of UK Biometric Working Group (BWG) in their annual report during 2003/2004. 
The group, which helps the British government implement biometric systems, was 
instrumental in setting up the European Biometrics Forum (EBF) and creating BIOVISION (a 
one-year European initiative funded by the EC with the principal aim of developing a 
“Roadmap” for European biometrics for the next 10 years). BWG, which also serves as 
JCT1/SC37 (a formal standard body) and liaisons to SC27 (the subcommittee on information 
security), considers aliveness testing as an appropriate countermeasure against spoofing of 
biometric authentication (UK Biometric, 2003, 2004). 
In an aliveness detection scheme, biometric authentication is augmented by a means for 
detecting that an object being presented to an authentication system is not an artificial 
dummy but is a part of a living person.  For example, a fingerprint identification means may 
be augmented by a means that detects the blood pulse from a fingertip so that the fingertip 
presented for authentication can be judged to be that of a living person.  However, even this 
method can be fooled, for example, by covering a living person’s fingertip, which will 
provide a pulse, with a thin, plastic-molded artificial fingertip that can provide an authentic 
fingerprint pattern. 
Although there are more reliable aliveness detection methods such as perspiration detection 
(Derakshani et al., 2003), skin color (Brownlee, 2001), medical-based measurement (Lapsley 
et al., 1998, Osten et al., 1998), rate of warming patents (O’Gorman & Schuckers, 2001), or 
challenges/responses methods (Fukuzumi, 2001), these are cumbersome in terms of device 
size, performance, cost, power requirements, operating environment, and human interaction 
requirements. Conversely, compact spectroscopy-based technologies which have been 
proposed for biometric identity determination (Rowe et al., 2007) can only work under a 
controlled measurement environment, as there are spectral alterations due to consumption 
of alcohol, exposure to warm/cold temperature, or other situation that could alter an 
individual’s complexion, blood circulation, etc. The author has shown that although 
spectroscopy can be used to capture even differences in fingerprint pattern (Pishva, 2007, 
2008, 2010) relying solely on spectroscopy for biometric identification can only worsen the 
biometrics false reject ratio as intra-individual spectral variation under a non-controlled 
measurement environment can be more than the spectral differences that exist due to 
fingerprint pattern differences. 
2. Objective and spectroscopic method  
As can be understood from the abovementioned examples, many spoofing techniques against 
biometrics authentication systems make use of an artificial or nonhuman material, such as a 
plastic fingertip, contact lens, copy medium, etc., to provide a false biometric signature. In 
view of this, the author considered that biometrics authentication systems can be significantly 
reinforced against spoofing by incorporating a means that enables judgment not simply of 
aliveness but judgment that an object being presented for authentication is a portion of a living 
human being that is free of any intervening artificial or prosthetic material. 
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An object of this work is therefore to provide a method and a system that enhances existing 
biometrics technology with a spectroscopic method in order to prevent spoofing. It goes 
beyond the simple approach of aliveness detection and proposes the implementation of 
verification of 'spectral signatures' or 'spectral factors' that are unique to human beings or a 
predetermined class or group of human beings in addition to currently employed 
methodologies in a multi-factor manner to reduce the likelihood of an imposter getting 
authenticated. Another aim of the work is to provide methods and systems that augment 
two widely used biometrics systems (fingerprint and iris recognition devices) with spectral 
biometrics capabilities in a practical manner and without creating much overhead or 
inconveniencing the users. 
2.1 Use of spectroscopic techniques 
Spectroscopy refers to a method of examining matter and its properties by analyzing light, 
sound, or particles that are emitted, absorbed or scattered by the matter under investigation 
(Wikipedia, 2011). A multiple biometrics system employing spectroscopy can make spoofing 
very difficult and time consuming, if not impossible. This is because a spectroscopic 
approach using various wavelengths allows us to examine various parameters of skin, 
underlying tissue, blood, fat, melanin pigment in eyes, etc. that vary from person to person, 
and makes spoofing a very difficult task of imitating multiple physiological characteristics. 
2.2 Skin morphology 
Skin is a complex biological structure made of different layers with distinct morphologies 
and optical properties. Conventionally, it is described by dividing it into two major layers. 
The inner layer, or the dermis, is between 1 to 4 mm thick and consists mainly of connective 
tissue composed of collagen fibers. Other dermal structures include nerves, blood vessels, 
lymph vessels, muscles, and gland units. The outer layer, the epidermis, is typically 40-µm 
thick, but it can be much thicker on load-bearing areas such as palms and soles. 
2.3 Skin reflectance 
When we look at light reflected from the skin, we usually see two distinct reflection 
components: a specular or interface reflection component Ls and a diffuse or body reflection 
component Lb (Shafer, 1985). The specular or interface reflection occurs at the surface and in 
only one direction, such that the incident light beam and the surface normal are coplanar, 
and angles between incident and reflected light are equal with respect to the surface normal.  
As shown in Fig. 1, not the entire incident light is reflected at the surface and some penetrate 
into the skin. The refracted light beam travels through the skin, hitting various physiological 
particles from time to time. Within the body, the light rays repeatedly get reflected and 
refracted at boundaries that have different refractive indices. Some of the scattered light 
ultimately return to the surface and exit from the skin in various directions, forming the 
diffuse reflection component Lb. This component carries information about the person’s skin 
color and his/her unique biological “spectral signature”. 
Using the 2-layer model, Ohtsuki and Healey (Ohtsuki & Healey, 1998) determined the 
surface reflectance, which takes place at the epidermis surface, to be about 5% of the 
incident light, independent of the lighting wavelength and the human race (Anderson & 
Parrish, 1981). The rest of the incident light (95%) enters the skin and becomes absorbed and 
scattered within the two skin layers. The absorption is mainly due to such ingredients in the 
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Fig. 1. Principle of body reflectance. 
blood as hemoglobin, bilirubin, and beta-carotene. Fig. 2(a) shows a spectral reflectance 
curve of a typical Caucasian skin (Anderson & Parrish, 1981, Melanoma, 2006). Fig. 2(b) 
shows an exploded form of this spectrum into its distinct components, namely: epidermis 
and hemoglobin (there are also spectra of water and collagen substances, but these do not 
play a significant role in the indicated wavelength range). As can be observed, the melanin 
in the epidermis absorbs the most part of blue light at ~ 470 nm; and hemoglobin absorbs 
green light at ~ 525 nm and red light at ~ 640 nm. Also, though not shown, near infrared 
light at 850nm is used to identify papillary dermis (Melanoma, 2006). 
 
 
                (a) Typical Caucasian skin spectrum                      (b) Its distinct components 
Fig. 2. A typical Caucasian skin spectrum and its distinct components (Melanoma, 2006). 
3. Proposed methodology and technical solution  
In order to achieve the above mentioned objectives, this work proposes to augment a base 
authentication technique, such as optical fingerprint matching, in which a non-spectrometric 
biometric signature, such as a fingerprint image, is acquired from a biometric signature 
source, such as a fingertip, with a means of extracting spectral information from the same 
biometric signature source in a practical manner that does not affect the size, performance, 
cost, power requirements, operating environment, and human interaction requirements of 
the base authentication technique. 
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3.1 Multi-factor authentication approach 
A multi-factor authentication method relies on either multiple biometrics or, biometrics in 
conjunction with smart cards and PINs in order to reduce the likelihood of an imposter 
being authenticated. One aspect according to this work provides: a multifactor 
authentication method including the steps of: acquiring a primary signature of a primary 
signature source of a subject to be authenticated; acquiring a secondary signature source of 
the subject; using the primary signature to determine the unique identity of the primary 
signature source; and using the using the secondary signature to verify that the subject to be 
authenticated belongs to a predetermined class of objects. 
Here, the primary source is a non-spectrometric biometric signature of a biometric signature 
source of the subject to be authenticated; and the secondary source is a spectral information 
of the biometric (primary) signature source; wherein the non-spectrometric biometric 
signature is used for determining the unique identity of the biometric signature source; and 
the spectral information for verifying that the subject to be authenticated is an authentic 
living human being. 
Here, the multifactor authentication method may further include the steps of: registering a 
non-spectrometric biometric signature of a biometric signature source of a subject to be 
authenticated; and registering spectral information of the biometric signature source; and in 
the step of using the non-spectrometric biometric signature to determine the unique identity of 
the biometric signature source, the acquired non-spectrometric biometric signature may be 
compared with the registered non-spectrometric biometric signature to determine the unique 
identity of the biometric signature source, and in the step of using the spectral information to 
verify that the subject to be authenticated belongs to the predetermined class of objects, the 
acquired spectral information may be compared with the registered spectral information to 
verify that the subject to be authenticated belongs to a predetermined class of objects. 
Here, a 'non-spectrometric biometric signature' refers to an image, pattern, set of 
geometrical parameters, or other form of biological trait data obtained by an existing 
biometrics technology. Thus for example, the subject to be authenticated may be a person, 
and with this example, the predetermined class of objects may be 'living human beings with 
predetermined spectral characteristics,' the biometric signature source may be a fingertip, 
the non-spectrometric biometric signature may be a fingerprint image of the fingertip, and 
the spectral information of the biometric signature source may be a diffuse reflectance 
spectrum of the fingertip. That is, with this example, first, a fingerprint image of a person's 
fingertip is registered and a diffuse reflectance spectrum of the person's same fingertip is 
registered. Thereafter, a fingerprint image of a fingertip of a person, who is to be 
authenticated, is acquired, and a diffuse reflectance spectrum of this person's same fingertip is 
acquired. The acquired fingerprint image is then compared with the registered fingerprint 
image to determine the unique identity of the person, in other words, to determine that the 
fingerprint is that of the person to be authenticated, that is, the person whose fingerprint had 
been registered in advance and not that of anybody else, and the acquired diffuse reflectance 
spectrum of the fingertip is compared with the registered reflectance spectrum to verify that 
the person is actually a living human body with the predetermined spectral characteristics. 
3.2 Reliability of the approach 
Here, because the non-spectrometric biometric signature, such as a fingerprint image, of the 
biometric signature source, such as the fingertip, is augmented by the spectral information 
of the biometric signature source, such as the diffuse reflectance spectrum of the fingertip, 
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so that while the non-spectrometric biometric signature (e.g. fingerprint image) ensures the 
unique identity of the object or the person to be authenticated, the spectral information (e.g. 
diffuse reflectance spectrum) ensures that the non-spectrometric biometric signature (e.g. 
fingerprint image) is a genuine signature of the predetermined class of objects (e.g. living 
human beings), spoofing, for example, that uses the non-spectrometric biometric signature 
(e.g. fingerprint image) formed on an object (e.g. copy medium, plastic finger, etc.) not 
belonging to the predetermined class of objects (e.g. living human beings) can be prevented. 
That is, the spectral information of an object reflects the optical complexity of that object, 
and the more complex an object is, the more complex the spectral information. In particular, 
skin or other portion of a living human is a complex biological structure made of different 
layers with distinct morphologies and optical properties. Thus for example, a diffuse 
reflectance spectrum obtained from a fingertip includes spectral components of such 
substances as melanin, hemoglobin, and other constituents of skin, muscle, blood, etc., with 
which the proportions present, etc. differ among individual persons. The spectral 
information obtained from a fingertip or other portion of a living human is thus extremely 
complex and cannot be replicated readily by the use of artificial dummies and prosthetic 
devices, and especially because in the present approach, the non-spectrometric biometric 
signature of the same portion is acquired for identification, spoofing is made a practically 
insurmountable task. 
In the above example of spoofing using a fingertip image printed on a copy medium, 
because any copy medium is an artificial object, such as paper, plastic, etc., or in the least, a 
non-living object, such as non-living skin, it cannot provide the same spectral information as 
that of a portion of a living human being. If an imposter attaches a fingertip cover, which is 
molded to provide the image of an authentic fingerprint image, to his/her own fingertip, the 
detected spectral information may contain spectral information of the imposter's fingertip, 
which is spectral information of a living human being. However, as long as the fingertip 
cover that is attached is an artificial object, or in the least, a non-living object, the detected 
spectral information will contain spectral information that differs from that of a living 
human being and thus as a whole, the detected spectral information will not be the same as 
that of a living human being. 
In the present approach, the spectral information is used to verify that the subject to be 
authenticated belongs to a predetermined class of objects. The predetermined class of objects 
is preferably broad enough to provide allowance for intra-object variations and yet narrow 
enough to preclude spoofing. In the above example, 'living human beings with 
predetermined spectral characteristics' is the predetermined class of objects, and this allows 
for intra-personal variations due to such external conditions as injury and exposure to high 
or low temperatures, chemicals, ultraviolet rays, or such internal conditions as changes in 
blood flow due to consumption of medicine, alcohol, etc., and at the same time precludes 
the use of artificial and non-living-human objects for spoofing. 
3.3 Implementation steps and means 
Here, the steps of acquiring the non-spectrometric biometric signature of the biometric 
signature source of the subject to be authenticated and acquiring the spectral information of 
the biometric signature source may be carried out simultaneously. This significantly 
shortens the time required for authentication. 
In the step of comparing the acquired spectral information with the registered spectral 
information to verify that the subject to be authenticated belongs to the predetermined class 
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of objects, cluster analysis may be performed on the acquired spectral information and the 
registered spectral information to determine a similarity value of the acquired spectral 
information and the registered spectral information, and the subject to be authenticated may 
be verified as belonging to the predetermined class of objects when the determined 
similarity value is within a predetermined range. 
Another aspect according to this approach provides: a multifactor authentication system 
including: a means for acquiring a non-spectrometric biometric signature of a biometric 
signature source of a subject to be authenticated; a means for acquiring spectral information 
of the biometric signature source; and a means that uses the non-spectrometric biometric 
signature to determine the unique identity of the biometric signature source and uses the 
spectral information to verify that the subject to be authenticated belongs to a 
predetermined class of objects. 
Here, the multifactor authentication system may further include: a means for storing an 
acquired non-spectrometric biometric signature as a registered non-spectrometric biometric 
signature and storing an acquired spectral information as registered spectral information; 
and the means that uses the non-spectrometric biometric signature to determine the unique 
identity of the biometric signature source and uses the spectral information to verify that the 
subject to be authenticated belongs to a predetermined class of objects may compare a newly 
acquired non-spectrometric biometric signature with the stored, registered non-
spectrometric biometric signature to determine the unique identity of the biometric 
signature source and compare newly acquired spectral information with the stored, 
registered spectral information to verify that the subject to be authenticated belongs to a 
predetermined class of objects. 
In the above-described example where the subject to be authenticated is a person, the 
predetermined class of objects is 'living human beings with predetermined spectral 
characteristics,' the biometric signature source is a fingertip, the non-spectrometric biometric 
signature is a fingerprint image of the fingertip, and the spectral information of the biometric 
signature source is a diffuse reflectance spectrum of the fingertip, the means for acquiring the 
non-spectrometric biometric signature may be a CCD or CMOS detecting system, with which 
an image of the fingerprint is formed on a detecting surface of a CCD or CMOS sensor, the 
means for acquiring the spectral information may be a photodiode array (PDA) detecting 
system, with which diffusely reflected light from the fingertip is spectrally dispersed onto a 
PDA, and a computer or other information processing means may be used as the means that 
uses the fingerprint image (non-spectrometric biometric signature) to determine the unique 
identity of the fingertip (biometric signature source) and uses the spectral information to verify 
that the person (subject to be authenticated) is a 'living human being with predetermined 
spectral characteristics' (belongs to the predetermined class of objects). 
Here, a half-mirror or a beam splitter may be used to simultaneously acquire the non-
spectrometric biometric signature (e.g. fingerprint image) and the spectral information (e.g. 
diffuse reflectance spectrum), and an extended portion of the CCD/ CMOS detector may be 
configured as PDAs for simultaneously capturing numerous identical spectra to be 
integrated into a single spectrum having a sufficient S/N ratio for spectral analysis. The 
system can thereby be made compact and high in the speed of authentication. 
4. Spectroscopic investigation 
To thoroughly investigate the applicability, effectiveness and usability of the spectroscopic 
method as an enhancement technique for preventing spoofing in existing biometrics 
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technology, a number of spectra from real fingers, real fingers covered with a fingertip 
molds that provide fingerprint pattern of authentic persons and artificial fingers made of 
different materials that contain authentic fingerprint patterns, were measured and analyzed. 
In the analysis phase, reflectance values of numerous physiological components (‘spectral 
factors’) were extracted from the measured spectra and Euclidean distances (Wikipedia, 
2011) among the corresponding extracted factors of the spectra were computed to verify 
authenticity of an identified individual. 
A through explanation of the investigation is given in (Pishva, 2008) and the author will 
simply highlight the main findings here. Furthermore, even though the spectroscopic 
investigation was only carried out on fingerprint system, the approach is general and can 
very well be applied to other biometrics systems such as iris pattern, hand geometry, etc.) 
4.1 Measurement 
Initially a total of 150 reflectance spectra (350nm ~ 1050nm) from 10 fingers of 5 Japanese 
men having a similar complexion was measured at three different times in order to 
investigate intra-individual and inter-individual spectral variations.  The experimental 
conditions during the three measurements were set so that there were no possible spectral 
alterations due to consumption of alcohol, exposure to warm/cold temperature, or other 
situation that could alter an individual’s complexion, blood circulation, etc., as it was done 
for the sake of a preliminary examination. 
In the second stage, under a similar condition, the five peoples’ fingers were covered with 
fingertip covers made of transparent plastic and rubber materials in order to provide 
fingerprint pattern of an authentic person. A set of similar measurements were also taken 
from artificial fingers that were made of craft paper, wooden and plastic materials. 
In the final stage, 750 spectra data were also measured from different fingers of a man (the 
above mentioned P1), a woman (W1) and a child (C1) under different conditions to study the 
effects of finger size, finger texture, finger orientation and as well as stableness of the ‘spectral 
factors’. Some spectra were measured when fingers placed flat, while others when rotated to 
counterclockwise or clockwise directions by about 45°. Some spectra were measured right after 
having lunch while others late in the evening. Some spectra were also measured after 
consumption of alcoholic drink (i.e. sometimes after drinking two bottles of beer). 
4.1.1 Spectral patterns of real fingers 
Fig. 3(a) shows the three spectra that were captured from the right index finger of an 
individual at three different times.  As can be observed, the spectra look identical, 
understandably because, it comes from an object of the same finger pattern, skin color and 
physiological structure. Fig. 3(b) shows spectra of the right index fingers of five different 
persons. As can be observed, around a general pattern, there are significant variations in the 
spectra as there are numerous physiological differences among individuals. Thus, it looks 
feasible to use such pattern and variations at different wavelengths to monitor and check 
aliveness and authenticity of the person during a biometrics’ verification process. 
4.1.2 Spectral patterns of bogus fingers 
Fig. 4 (a) shows spectral patterns of artificial fingers made of craft paper, wooden and 
rubber materials (non-living objects) which are supposedly contain fingerprint of the person 
whose finger spectral pattern is shown in Fig. 3(a). As can be clearly observed, spectral 
patterns of craft paper, wooden and rubber fingers are quite different from each other and 
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      (a) The same person’s finger spectra                 (b) Variation among different persons 
Fig. 3. An individual’s finger spectra and spectral variation among different individuals. 
they are also very much different from that of the authentic person’s finger spectra. It is 
obvious that shape of the spectra from artificial finger highly depends on the base materials 
used in making them rather than the fingerprint pattern that is molded on them. Fig. 4(b) 
shows spectral patterns of the right index finger of the person whose finger spectral pattern 
is shown in Fig. 3(a), when covered with his fingertip prints made of transparent plastic and 
rubber materials. As can be observed, each spectrum, though different, have a general shape 
as the transparent fingertips are worn by the same person. It should also be noted that the 
spectra are different from those of the artificial finger spectra shown in Fig. 4(a) and the 
authentic one indicated in Fig. 3(a). This justifies an earlier claim that attachment of artificial 
fingertip cover on a real finger alters the reflectance spectra and is a proof of the robustness 
of the multi-factor spectral biometrics approach. 
 
 
         (a) Spectral patterns of artificial fingers                (b) Spectral patterns with fingertips 
Fig. 4. Spectral Patterns of Artificial Fingers and fingers covered with fingertips. 
4.2 Data analysis 
Cluster analysis with MINITAB statistical software (Minitab, 2009) was used for data 
analysis after extracting ‘spectral factors’ from the measured spectra. In this work spectral 
factors’ refers to reflectance values at certain wavelengths or regions on a spectrum which 
correspond to specific physiological components. For example, in the finger reflectance 
spectrum of Fig. 5, shaded areas correspond to certain physiological components (i.e., 350 to 
470 nm indicate melanin reflectance, vicinity of 525 nm, 640 nm and 850 nm indicate 
hemoglobin,  vicinity of 650 and 750 nm are for arterial blood peak, and 750 and 925 nm are 
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for venous blood peak (Melanoma, 2006, Pishva, 2007). Each ‘spectral factor’ can be 
extracted by computing area of the corresponding shaded region. 
 
 
Fig. 5. ‘Spectral Factors’ Regions. 
4.2.1 Results at verification phase – presentation of real fingers 
Table 1 shows the ‘Similarity’ values that are obtained when P1-1 is used as the registered 
template set and the extracted ‘spectral factor’ sets of the five persons are presented, one set 
at a time, to the analysis routine as the newly acquired ‘spectral factors’ for verification. 
 
Template 
Value 
Newly Acquired 
‘Spectral Factors’
‘Similarity’ 
Level 
P1-1 P1-1 100.00 
P1-1 P1-2 99.47 
P1-1 P1-3 99.49 
P1-1 P2-1 96.03 
P1-1 P2-2 96.39 
P1-1 P2-3 96.29 
P1-1 P3-1 92.20 
P1-1 P3-2 92.01 
P1-1 P3-3 92.02 
P1-1 P4-1 86.86 
P1-1 P4-2 86.87 
P1-1 P4-3 86.01 
P1-1 P5-1 65.49 
P1-1 P5-2 65.49 
P1-1 P5-3 64.71 
Table 1. ‘Similarity’ values of real finger spectra. 
As can be seen, whereas ‘Similarity’ values higher than 99% are obtained when the ‘spectral 
factors’ of the same finger of the same person are presented in the verification phase, the 
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‘Similarity’ value drops significantly (96% to 64%) when a different person’s ‘spectral 
factors’ are presented. 
4.2.2 Results at verification phase – presentation of bogus fingers  
In the previous section, it was shown that a ‘Similarity’ value higher than 99% is obtained 
when the same person’s ‘spectral factors’ are presented to the analysis routine. As such, 
some researchers have even proposed that skin spectroscopy alone can be used for 
biometrics identity determination of an individual (Rowe et al., 2007). This work, however, 
proposes spectral biometrics as an enhancement technique and not as an identification 
method.  
Table 2 shows the ‘Similarity’ values determined in the verification phase when P1-1 is used 
as the registered template, and the ‘spectral factors,’ extracted from the index finger of P1 at 
different times under various conditions, the fingers of five persons covered with 
transparent plastic and rubber fingertip molds having the fingerprint pattern of the 
authentic person (P1) and artificial fingers made of craft paper, wooden and plastic 
materials that contain the authentic fingerprint pattern of P1, are presented one set at a time 
as the newly acquired ‘spectral factors.’ 
 
Template Value 
Newly Acquired 
‘Spectral Factors’ 
‘Similarity’ 
Level 
P1-1 P1-2 (authentic, controlled) 99.47 
P1-1 P1-m (authentic, after meal) 96.23 
P1-1 P1-n (authentic after alcohol) 95.46 
P1-1 P1onP1-PlasticCvr-1 82.00 
P1-1 P1onP1-RubberCvr-1 78.28 
P1-1 P1onP2-PlasticCvr-1 91.20 
P1-1 P1onP2-RubberCvr-1 93.13 
P1-1 P1onP3-PlasticCvr-1 85.05 
P1-1 P1onP3-RubberCvr-1 84.09 
P1-1 P1onP4-PlasticCvr-1 88.22 
P1-1 P1onP4-RubberCvr-1 90.09 
P1-1 P1onP5-PlasticCvr-1 81.21 
P1-1 P1onP5-RubberCvr-1 79.44 
P1-1 P1onCraftPaperFngr-1 62.85 
P1-1 P1onWoodenFngr-1 48.94 
P1-1 P1onPlasticFngr-1 59.27 
Table 2. ‘Similarity’ values during verification process. 
As can be observed from Table 2, ‘Similarity’ values obtained from artificial fingers and 
fingers containing fingertip covers are quite different from that of the real authentic finger. 
However, even for the real authentic finger, ‘Similarity’ values obtained under a controlled 
measurement environment is much better than those obtained under relaxed conditions 
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(e.g., after having meal or being under the influence of alcohol).  In fact some ‘Similarity’ 
values obtained under a more relaxed condition are comparable to those values that were 
obtained from another person (e.g., person P2 in Table 1). This clearly indicates that 
although the use of spectral biometrics as the sole means for identity determination may be 
difficult, spectral biometrics can be used as an enhancement technique, as proposed in this 
work, since it discriminates authentic fingers from artificial fingers and fingers containing 
fingertip covers. 
4.3 Optimal boundary conditions 
In order to obtain a consistently reliable result, determination of optimal boundary 
conditions including establishment of optimal settings and effect of spectrum resolution was 
carried out.  It was found out that the stability of the ‘spectral factors’ for consistently 
generating a ‘Similarity’ value higher than 95%, largely depended on the size of the 
measurement spot rather than on the physiological or environmental factors, or spectrum 
resolution. Sampling the center of a 1 cm2 measurement spot, a condition which can easily 
be provided by thumb fingers, provided a uniform reflectance condition at the measurement 
point (Pishva, 2008). 
5. System configuration and application scope 
As mentioned earlier, this work proposes spectral biometrics methods as enhancement 
techniques for preventing spoofing in existing biometrics technologies. The idea is to double 
check the authenticity of an identified subject in order to ensure that a live person with a 
matching biological ‘spectral signature’ is being authenticated. As such, implementation and 
configuration of multi-factor spectral biometrics would depend on the configuration of the 
base biometrics authentication technology used in the system.  
Moreover, when complementing existing biometrics technology with a spectral biometrics 
method, factors such as the device size, performance, cost, power requirements, operating 
environment, and human interaction requirements must also be considered. Taking these 
into account, this section shows how the two widely used biometrics systems (fingerprint 
and iris recognition devices) can be augmented with spectral biometrics without creating 
much overhead or inconvenience to users. 
5.1 Preferred configuration for fingerprint authentication system 
Preferred embodiments of this approach shall now be described. Fig. 6 is a schematic 
diagram of a basic arrangement of a spectral biometrics enhanced authentication system 
according to a first embodiment of this approach, which is a fingerprint authentication 
device that authenticates a person's identity based on his/her fingerprint and biospectral 
characteristics of his/her finger. 
As shown in Fig. 6, this fingerprint authentication device 1 includes a measurement unit 2, a 
controller 120, a memory (storage device) 130, and a monitor 140. The measurement unit 2 
includes an optical system 10 and a CCD (charge coupled device; image sensor) 100. The 
optical system 10 includes an I2 lamp (light source) 15, a sheet prism (prism means) 20, a 
first lens 40, a second lens 60, a mirror 70, and a diffraction grating 80. As shown in Fig. 7, 
the CCD 100 is an image sensor with pixels arranged in 1280 rows and 1024 columns and 
has an image acquisition portion 102 (first portion of a detecting surface of the CCD sensor), 
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Fig. 6. A Schematic diagram of a basic arrangement according to a first embodiment. 
which is a region of 960×960 pixels at an upper portion of the CCD 100 that excludes the 
pixels of 32 edge rows at the top side and 32 columns at each of the left and right sides of the 
CCD 100 as boundary pixels, and a spectrum acquisition portion 103 (second portion of a 
detecting surface of the CCD sensor), which is a region of 160×960 pixels at a lower portion 
of the CCD 100 that excludes the pixels of 32 edge rows at the bottom side and 32 columns 
at each of the left and right sides of the CCD 100 as boundary pixels. 96 rows of pixels 
between the image acquisition portion and the spectrum acquisition portion 103 are also 
handled as boundary pixels. The controller 120 is electrically connected to the CCD 100, the 
memory 130, and the monitor 140 and controls operations of these components by issuing 
appropriate instruction signals. The memory 130 has a measured image (matrix) storage area 
132, a reference spectrum (vector) storage area 133, a measured spectrum (vector) storage area 
134, a reduced measured spectrum (vector) storage area 135, registered image 
 
 
Fig. 7. A schematic diagram of a CCD (image sensor) according to a first embodiment. 
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pattern (template) storage areas 1361 to 136n (where n is an integer greater than 1), registered 
spectral template data storage areas 1371 to 137n, an identity storage area 138, and registered 
identity storage areas 1391 to 139n. The controller 120 is also electrically connected to a card 
reader 150 that serves as an identity inputting means. 
A manner in which a fingerprint image is acquired as a non-spectrometric biometric 
signature of a fingertip (biometric signature source) of a person (subject to be authenticated) 
and a diffuse reflectance spectrum of the fingertip is acquired as spectral information of the 
fingertip (biometric signature source) by this fingerprint authentication device 1 shall now 
be described. 
5.1.1 Incident light and its reflected components 
As shown in Fig. 6, with this fingerprint authentication device 1, light from the I2 lamp 15 is 
made incident via a sheet prism 20 onto a finger 311, which belongs to a person 301 to be 
authenticated and is being pressed against an upper surface of the sheet prism 20. A portion 
of the light made incident on the finger 311 is reflected as a specular reflection component Ls 
from the surface of the finger 311, and a first lens 40 forms an image of this specular 
reflection component Ls on the image acquisition portion 102 of the CCD 100. 
Another portion of the light made incident on the finger 311 penetrates into the skin, is 
refracted, reflected, absorbed, or re-emitted as fluorescence or phosphorescence, etc. by 
internal tissue, blood, and other various physiological components inside and below the 
skin, and some of this light ultimately returns to the surface and exits from the skin in 
various directions, thus forming a diffuse reflection component Lb. Because this light 
component results from light that has traveled inside the skin, it carries information 
concerning the person's skin color and his/her unique biological 'spectral signature' (Fig 4). 
After exiting from the skin, the diffuse reflection component Lb passes through the sheet 
prism 20 and is converged, via the second lens 60 and the mirror 70, onto the diffraction 
grating 80, which spectrally disperses and makes the diffuse reflection component Lb 
incident on the spectrum acquisition portion 103 of the CCD 100 in a manner such that a 
fingertip diffuse reflection spectrum of a range of 350nm to 1050nm is acquired from each 
row of the spectrum acquisition portion 103. 
5.1.2 Reflected components and their detection process 
Light made incident on the CCD 100 is photoelectrically converted into electrical charges at 
the respective pixels. In accordance to an instruction signal from a measurement controlling 
unit 122 of the controller 120, these charges are electronically shifted into a horizontal shift 
register 104, one row at a time, and thereafter, the contents of the horizontal shift register 
104 are shifted, one pixel at a time, into a capacitor 105. The charges in the capacitor 105 are 
then provided as an analog voltage to an amplifier 106, which performs amplification to an 
appropriate analog voltage level (e.g., 0 to 10 volts). The amplified voltage output by the 
amplifier is then converted to a digital value by an analog-to-digital (A/D) converter 107. 
The digital values output by the A/D converter 107 are then input as data into the memory 
130 according to instruction signals from the measurement controlling unit 122 of the 
controller 120. The digital values obtained by reading the charges from the image 
acquisition portion 102 of the CCD 100 are thus stored as data in the measured image 
storage area 132 in accordance to an instruction signal from the controller 120, and the 
digital values obtained by reading the charges from the spectrum acquisition portion 103 of 
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the CCD 100 are binned as data in the measured spectrum storage area 134 in accordance to 
an instruction signal from the measurement controlling unit 122 of the controller 120. 
In this readout process, the data of the boundary pixels (i.e. the pixels of the 32 edge rows at 
the top and bottom sides, the 32 columns at each of the left and right sides, and the 96 rows 
between the image acquisition portion 102 and the spectrum acquisition portion 103 of the 
CCD 100) are ignored as data that may not be reliable in comparison to data of other 
portions or as data that may be hybrid data of the image and the spectrum. 
5.1.3 Authentication process 
An authentication process using the fingerprint authentication device 1 shall now be 
described with reference to the flowcharts of Fig 8. This authentication process is 
constituted of an enrollment process (Fig. 8a), in which a person's fingerprint image and 
fingertip diffuse reflectance spectrum are registered along with the person's identity, and 
a verification process (Fig. 8b), which is performed each time a person needs to be 
verified. 
 
 
(Fig 8.a) Flowchart of an enrolment process 
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(Fig 8.b) Flowchart of a verification process 
Fig. 8. A flowchart of an enrolment and a verification process in an authentication process 
according to an embodiment of this work. 
5.1.3.1 Enrollment process 
Firstly, in the enrollment process shown in Fig. 8(a), a diffuse reflectance spectrum Sref of a 
standard white plate (not shown) is set on the upper surface of the sheet prism 20 and its 
diffuse reflectance spectrum Sref is measured. The spectrum data Sref that are obtained by 
this measurement and stored in the measured spectrum storage area 134 of the memory 130 
are then transferred and re-stored in the reference spectrum storage area 133 of the memory 
130 (step S11). 
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Identity information, such as the name, etc. of the person 301, are then read from an ID card 
321, belonging to the person 301, by means of the card reader 150 and stored as registered 
identity information DR1 in the registered identity storage area 1391 (step S12). 
Fingerprint image data IM and fingertip diffuse reflectance raw spectrum data SMr of the 
person 301 are then captured and measured as described above and stored in the measured 
image storage area 132 and the measured spectrum storage area 134, respectively, of the 
memory 130 (step S13). 
The controller 120 then issues an instruction signal to the memory 130 to make the 
fingerprint image data IM, stored in the measured image storage area 132, be transmitted to 
an analyzing unit 123, where a fingerprint pattern is extracted from the fingerprint image 
data IM. Methods of extracting a fingerprint pattern from such fingerprint image data are 
well-known and described, for example, in 'Handbook of Fingerprint Recognition,' (Maltoni 
et al., 2003), and a detailed description thereof shall not be provided here. The controller 120 
then stores the extracted fingerprint pattern, for example, as a registered (template) 
fingerprint pattern IR1 in the registered image pattern (template) storage area 1361 so that 
this fingerprint pattern is associated with the registered associated identity information DR1 
in the registered identity storage area 1391 (step S14). 
Next, the controller 120 issues an instruction signal to the memory 130 to make the fingertip 
diffuse reflectance raw spectrum data SMr, stored in the measured spectrum storage area 
134, and the reference reflectance spectrum data Sref, stored in the reference spectrum 
storage area 133, be transmitted to the analyzing unit 123. In the analyzing unit 123, the 
fingertip diffuse reflectance raw spectrum data SMr are converted to fingertip diffuse 
reflectance spectrum data SM by using the values of reference reflectance spectrum data Sref 
as 100% reflectance. Spectral factors are then extracted from the fingertip diffuse reflectance 
spectrum data SM. In the present example, the fingertip diffuse reflectance spectrum data SM 
is integrated in the respective ranges of 350 to 400nm, 401 to 470nm, 500 to 560nm, 600 to 
660nm, 730 to 790nm, 830 to 900nm, and 925 to 1025nm to obtain seven integration values 
(Fig. 5). Here, the ranges of 350 to 400nm and 401 to 470nm correspond to peaks due to 
melanin, the ranges of 500 to 560nm, 600 to 660nm, and 830 to 900nm correspond to peaks 
due to hemoglobin, the range of 730 to 790nm corresponds to arterial blood, and the range 
of 925 to 1025nm corresponds to venous blood. The resulting seven values are then stored as 
a registered fingertip diffuse reflectance spectral template vector SR1 in the registered 
spectral template data storage area 1371, and this spectral template vector is thereby 
associated with the registered associated identity information DR1 in the registered identity 
storage area 1391 (step S15). 
This enrollment process is not performed each time a person needs to be authenticated but 
is performed just once or once every predetermined interval (months, years, etc.). Also, for 
persons besides the person 301, the procedure from step S12 to step S15 of this enrollment 
process may be performed at any time to register a registered fingerprint image IR and a 
registered fingertip diffuse reflectance spectrum SR in association with an associated identity 
information DR for each of an arbitrary number n of persons. 
5.1.3.2 Verification process 
In the verification process (Fig. 8b), first, the identity information of a person 30 to be 
authenticated are read from an ID card 32, belonging to the person 30, by means of the card 
reader 150 and stored as identity information D in the identity storage area 138 (step S21). 
Fingerprint image data IM and fingertip diffuse reflectance raw spectrum data SMr of the 
person 30 are then captured and measured as described above and stored in the measured 
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image storage area 132 and the measured spectrum storage area 134, respectively, of the 
memory 130 (step S22). 
The controller 120 then issues an instruction signal to the memory 130 to make the identity 
information D, stored in the identity storage area 138, be transmitted to the analyzing unit 
123. At the analyzing unit 123, the identity information D is compared with each of the 
registered associated identity information DR1 # DRn in the registered identity storage areas 
1391 # 139n to find matching registered identity information (step S23, S24). If matching 
registered identity information is found, step S25 is entered. On the other hand, if matching 
registered identity information is not found, step S41 is entered, in which a message, such as 
'No matching identity information,' is displayed on the monitor 140, and then the process is 
ended without authentication of the person 30. 
5.1.3.3 Process at control and analysis unit 
For the present description, it shall be deemed that the identity information D matches the 
registered associated identity information DRx of a person 30x (where x is a value in the 
range of 1 to n). In this case, upon entering step S25, the controller 120 issues an instruction 
signal to the memory 130 to make the fingerprint image data IM, stored in the measured 
image storage area 132, be transmitted to the analyzing unit 123, where a fingerprint pattern 
IP is extracted from the fingerprint image data IM. At the analyzing unit 123, the extracted 
fingerprint pattern IP is compared with the registered fingerprint pattern IRx in the registered 
image pattern storage area 136x, which is the fingerprint pattern associated with the 
registered identity information DRx, to judge whether the extracted fingerprint pattern IP 
matches the registered fingerprint pattern IRx (step S26). Methods of comparing fingerprint 
patterns from such fingerprint image data are well-known and described, for example, in 
the abovementioned 'Handbook of Fingerprint Recognition,' (Maltoni et al., 2003), and a 
detailed description thereof shall not be provided here. 
If by the above analysis of step S26, the extracted fingerprint pattern IP is found to match the 
registered fingerprint pattern IRx, step S27 is entered. On the other hand, if the fingerprint 
patterns do not match, step S42 is entered, in which a message, such as 'Fingerprints do not 
match!' is displayed on the monitor 140, and then the process is ended without 
authentication of the person 30. 
For the present description, it shall be deemed that the extracted fingerprint pattern IP 
matches the registered fingerprint pattern IRx. In this case, upon entering step S27, the 
controller 120 issues an instruction signal to the memory 130 to make the fingertip diffuse 
reflectance raw spectrum data SMr, which are of the person 30 and are stored in the 
measured spectrum storage area 134, and the reference reflectance spectrum data Sref, which 
are stored in the reference spectrum storage area 133, be transmitted to the analyzing unit 
123. In the analyzing unit 123, the fingertip diffuse reflectance raw spectrum data SMr are 
converted to fingertip diffuse reflectance spectrum data SM of the person 30 by using the 
values of reference reflectance spectrum data Sref as 100% reflectance. Seven spectral factors 
are then extracted as a spectral factor vector SF from the fingertip diffuse reflectance 
spectrum data SM in the same manner as described above. A similarity value of the spectral 
factor vector SF thus acquired and the registered fingertip diffuse reflectance spectral 
template vector SRx in the registered spectral template data storage area 137x, which is 
associated with the registered identity information DRx, is then computed by cluster analysis 
using single linkage Euclidean distance. The computation of the similarity value is 
performed, for example, using a cluster analysis software, such as Minitab Statistical 
Software© (made by Minitab Inc., 2009), and using a seven-valued vector R0, having zero 
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entries for all seven spectral factors, as a dissimilarity reference vector corresponding to a 
similarity value of 39.11%. Because the computation of the similarity value by cluster 
analysis using single linkage Euclidean distance is a well-known art (see for example, 
Ragnemalm, PhD Thesis 1993), a detailed description thereof shall be omitted here. 
The computed similarity value is then compared with, for example, an empirically determined 
threshold value of 95% (S28). If the computed similarity value is greater than or equal to this 
threshold value, the process ends upon authentication of person 30 as the person 30x (step 
S29). On the other hand, if the computed similarity value is less than the threshold value, step 
S44 is entered, in which a message, such as 'Authentication denied!' is displayed on the 
monitor 140 and then the process is ended without authentication of the person 30. 
5.1.4 Reliability of the approach 
As can be understood from the above description of the embodiment, with the present 
approach, because a non-spectrometric biometric signature (fingerprint image) of a 
biometric signature source (fingertip) is augmented by spectral information of the biometric 
signature source (diffuse reflectance spectrum of the fingertip) in a manner such that the 
non-spectrometric biometric signature (fingerprint image) is used to ensure the unique 
identity of the object (person) to be authenticated and the spectral information (diffuse 
reflectance spectrum) is used to ensure that the non-spectrometric biometric signature 
(fingerprint image) is a genuine signature of the predetermined class of objects (living 
human beings with fingerprint diffuse spectral characteristics within a predetermined 
similarity range of predetermined characteristics), spoofing, for example, that uses a non-
spectrometric biometric signature (fingerprint image) formed on an object (e.g. copy 
medium, plastic finger, etc.) not belonging to the predetermined class of objects (living 
human beings with fingerprint diffuse spectral characteristics within a predetermined 
similarity range) can be prevented. That is, the spectral information of an object reflects the 
optical complexity of that object, and the more complex an object is, the more complex the 
spectral information. In particular, skin or other portion of a living human is a complex 
biological structure made of different layers with distinct morphologies and optical 
properties. Thus for example, a diffuse reflectance spectrum obtained from a fingertip 
includes spectral components of such substances as melanin, hemoglobin, and other 
constituents of skin, muscle, blood, etc., with which the proportions present, etc. differ 
among individual persons (see, for example, Fig. 3b). The spectral information obtained 
from a fingertip or other portion of a living human is thus extremely complex and cannot be 
replicated readily by the use of artificial dummies and prosthetic devices, and especially 
because in this approach, the non-spectrometric biometric signature of the same portion is 
acquired for identification, spoofing is made a practically insurmountable task. 
5.2 Preferred configuration for iris authentication system 
To illustrate a further scope of application of this approach, a second embodiment according to 
this approach shall now be described. Fig. 9 is a schematic diagram of a basic arrangement of a 
spectral biometrics enhanced authentication system according to the second embodiment of 
this approach, which is an iris authentication device 200 that authenticates a person's identity 
based on his/her iris pattern and biospectral characteristics of his/her iris. 
5.2.1 Incident light and its reflected components 
As shown in Fig. 9, this iris authentication device 200 uses the same CCD 100, having the 
image acquisition portion 102 and the spectrum acquisition portion 103, as that used in the 
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Fig. 9. A schematic diagram of a basic arrangement of a spectral biometrics enhanced 
authentication system according to a second embodiment of this work. 
first embodiment. With this authentication device 200, an image of an iris 35 of a person 30 
to be authenticated is formed on the image acquisition portion 102 by a lens 340. A portion 
(10% to 20%) of the light propagating from the iris 35 to the CCD 100 is reflected by a half-
mirror 240 and then reflected by a mirror 242 onto a diffraction grating 244, which spectrally 
disperses and makes the component, reflected by the half-mirror 240, incident on the 
spectrum acquisition portion 103 of the CCD 100 in a manner such that a reflection spectrum 
of the iris within a range of 350nm to 1050nm can be acquired from each row of the 
spectrum acquisition portion 103. 
5.2.2 Data acquisition and authentication process 
The iris image, acquired by the image acquisition portion 102 of the CCD 100, and the iris 
reflection spectrum, acquired by the spectrum acquisition portion 103, are then handled in 
the same manner as the fingerprint image and fingertip diffuse reflectance spectrum, 
respectively, of the first embodiment to obtain an iris pattern and an iris spectral 
information vector, which are then handled in the same manner as the fingerprint image 
pattern and the fingertip spectral information vector of the first embodiment to perform the 
authentication process.  
5.2.3 Reliability of the approach 
As with the fingertip diffuse reflectance spectrum, the iris reflection spectrum contains 
information on internal tissue, blood, and other various physiological components of the eye 
(iris) and thus provides information concerning a person's unique biological spectral 
signature that cannot be spoofed readily. 
5.3 More general system configuration approach 
The present approach is not limited to the embodiments described above, and various 
modifications can be made within the scope of the approach. For example, although the 
CCD 100, having pixels arranged in 1280 rows and 1024 columns, was used as the image 
sensor in the embodiment described above, a CCD of any other size may be used or a CMOS 
device may be used instead as the image sensor. Also together with a CCD, CMOS sensor, 
or other image sensor; a PDA (photodiode array) or a sensor having just the same number of 
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photodetecting elements as the number of spectral information to be determined (seven in 
the case of the above-described embodiments) may be configured to perform image 
acquisition and spectrum acquisition, respectively. Other variations such as employment of 
different light source (e.g., D2 lamp, laser, etc.) for acquisition, use of a more flexible ID 
reading mechanism for database access, or use of different biometrics signature (e.g., hand 
geometry, facial features, retinal print, etc.)  may also be employed instead. Furthermore, 
during the analysis process a different wavelength range, wavelength number, or even a 
different pattern recognition method; such as neural networks, fuzzy logic, or linear 
programming may be employed instead. 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter showed that it is quite feasible to use spectral biometrics as a complementary 
method for preventing spoofing of existing biometrics technologies. The proposed method 
ensures that the identity obtained through the primary biometrics signature comes from a 
living, authentic person. It also showed how spectral biometrics can be implemented in two 
widely-used biometrics systems in a practical manner without introducing much overhead 
to the base biometrics technology or inconvenience to users.  
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and far from satisfactory in terms of robustness and accuracy, vulnerability to fraud and forgery, and use of
acceptable and appropriate authentication protocols. To address some challenges, and the requirements of
new and emerging applications, and for seamless diffusion of biometrics in society, there is a need for
development of novel paradigms and protocols, and improved algorithms and authentication techniques. This
book volume on â€œAdvanced Biometric Technologiesâ€ ​ is dedicated to the work being pursued by
researchers around the world in this area, and includes some of the recent findings and their applications to
address the challenges and emerging requirements for biometric based identity authentication systems. The
book consists of 18 Chapters and is divided into four sections namely novel approaches, advanced algorithms,
emerging applications and the multimodal fusion. The book was reviewed by editors Dr. Girija Chetty and Dr.
Jucheng Yang We deeply appreciate the efforts of our guest editors: Dr. Norman Poh, Dr. Loris Nanni, Dr.
Jianjiang Feng, Dr. Dongsun Park and Dr. Sook Yoon, as well as a number of anonymous reviewers.
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